This is a misleading title. The limits of this attack make it so that your better off fork bombing the system then trying to "hack" it with this kind of attack. The two attacks specified are making it impossible to create a specifically named file in a shared directory, and making deletes take a long time. Neither of these is a real DoS attack and Chris appears to be taking the reasonable approach of acknowledging that it can be made better and scheduling it for the next pull window.
That's extremely uncharitable. The major difference that you gloss over is that one has tools to stop fork bombs, but there are no tools to stop this kind of attack.
This attack can easily be used to disrupt systems. I can imagine every naive implementation of file upload out there being vulnerable to this. When the system goes to delete old uploaded files, it halts.
I'm not sure how "making deletes take a long time" is not a DoS attack.
This whole article smells of grandstanding.