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It's a trade-off though, isn't it? Everyone seems upset about OCSP as of late, but the domains being sent in plaintext is not exactly limited to just OCSP - we've had this with SNI and DNS.

The advantages of OCSP are that you get a real-time understanding of the status of a certificate and you're not needing to download large CRLs which are stale very quickly. If you set security.OCSP.require appropriately, you don't have any risk of the browser failing open, either.

It seems to me like the people who most dislike OCSP are CAs who have to maintain the infrastructure capable of responding to queries. I have really limited sympathy, that should be part of running a CA.

The privacy concerns could be solved by mandating OCSP stapling, and you could then operate the OCSP responders purely for web-servers and folks doing research.

Unfortunately the ship has sailed with ballot SC63 now, and we are where we are. I don't necessarily agree that OCSP as a concept was unfixable, though.



> Everyone seems upset about OCSP as of late, but the domains being sent in plaintext is not exactly limited to just OCSP - we've had this with SNI and DNS.

My main privacy related concern isn't about domains being sent in plaintext but that they are sent to the CA and they can then theoretically do analytics on this data and profile web users.

But maybe this concern doesn't really make sense as we have strict personal-data regulations now.




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