Then that would be a specific environmental consideration. The argument I was addressing was the consideration on utilitarian grounds.
It's possible that there may be second order environmental affects on the utilitarian calculus. I.e. the loss of sharks, causes enough ecosystem imbalance that it out-weights the direct suffering caused by species X. But that's specifically an empirical claim, and simply claiming that "sharks feel pain" isn't sufficient.
In general there's no reason to believe that the current ecological balance is the utilitarian optimal. Darwin selects for inclusive fitness, and doesn't give a hoot about animal suffering. Imagining that the pre-existence of a large predator population exists to improve the lives of the prey population is succumbing to the fallacy of group selection.
It's possible that there may be second order environmental affects on the utilitarian calculus. I.e. the loss of sharks, causes enough ecosystem imbalance that it out-weights the direct suffering caused by species X. But that's specifically an empirical claim, and simply claiming that "sharks feel pain" isn't sufficient.
In general there's no reason to believe that the current ecological balance is the utilitarian optimal. Darwin selects for inclusive fitness, and doesn't give a hoot about animal suffering. Imagining that the pre-existence of a large predator population exists to improve the lives of the prey population is succumbing to the fallacy of group selection.