The issue wasn't a lack of planning by the military it was a lack of commitment on the goals by the administration. If it was just a desert storm style campaign (hit them very hard over a month then leave without finishing off Saddam) then they should have left already when Iran offered to open the strait, and it could have been sold as a success.
If they want Iran to truely bend the knee over nukes then they have to commit harder militarily than they are now, which neither the president nor the public seems to have an appetite for and Iran knows that. So now it's mostly deadlocked on both the US demanding Iran lose face by giving up Uranium immediately, while Israel wants to keep up an air campaign to further neuter Irans combat capabilities to free up their own strategic goals against Hezbollah and Hamas. But neither options are properly aligned, especially with fanatics in IRGC taking over.
It's either a short air campaign or a war, but they can't seem to decide so we are left with an blockade.
> If they want Iran to truely bend the knee over nukes
then they never should have torn up the agreement that saw multiple third party inspectors having feet on the ground and leaving in place tamper resistant / tamper revealing air filters and spectrometer instrumentation.
Instead a path has been taken that has upped the HEU game and hardened the core guard and fanatics.
When did Iran offer this? (One problem with a decapitation strike is you no longer have a single party to negotiate with.)
> If they want Iran to truely bend the knee over nukes then they have to commit harder militarily than they are now
It's genuinely unclear if America has the military power to project into Iran to the degree a ground invasion would require. (Like, short of carpet bombing the country's infrastructure and industry out of existence.)
Missiles, drones and space-based surveillance have tilted the balance in favour of defenders, at least on the ground. American firepower can constrain Iran to within its airspace and maritime borders. But even if it made sense to, it's questionable whether we can influence much within them.
Trump complicated things by demanding the uranium immediately and Israel much more complicated things by overreacting to Lebanon striking Israel when the blockade started (Iran likely told Hezbollah to hit Israel as a negotiation gambit). This means to sign a deal Iran now had to both embarrass themselves by giving up uranium and also show that IRGC abandons their partners (Hezbollah, Hamas) which will ruin their whole militia proxy war ambitions they’ve been spending millions on since the Lebanon civil war.
I personally believe Iran was willing to compromise on the uranium in exchange for the US totally dropping sanctions. It is Israel being hyper aggressive that is ruining things by trying to retake southern Lebanon (which they controlled until 2000) and pushing US to resume the air campaign… while now also spying on US negotiators.
Iran opened the strait as a gesture after the Lebanon ceasefire was announced. Trump then immediately announced "blockade stays" in some truth social rant, so they reclosed it within a day.
Don't forget the part where the Lebanon ceasefire was announced, Israel decided to continue its bombing and occupation campaign and broke the ceasefire, then Trump immediately announced the blockade stays in that TS rant.
Technically Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel first on March 2nd and Israel responded… then Israel repeatedly bullshitted some ceasefires to keep the US placated while they simultaneously ramping up both a ground invasion and air campaign. Hezbollah equally is no doubt being pushed hard to keep fighting by Iran.
Israel is definitely showing they are a bad partner to the US and should be the more responsible one (nobody expects much from Hezbollah which Iran just selfishly exploits). But Netanyahu seems to want to burn everything to the ground while he still can since he knows his career is already over.
Pretty much all of shi'a Lebanon has been occupied and Israel has publicly stated their plan is to turn it into Gaza. Dunno if Hezbollah needs encouragement from anyone else at this point.
Israel broke the ceasefire first by continuing to occupy the Bekaa valley and Lebanese land all the way up to the Litani river. When they showed no signs of leaving, Iran said that Israel's breaking the ceasefire and that's when mango Mussolini announced the blockade.
Iran can't even tell Hezbollah to stand down because the group was already extremely weakened after the October 7 war and the death of Haniyeh.
So you think Google is going to spend $11B in hopes it will boost the value of the SpaceX stock, while pretending to public investors it's a multi-year thing, and then after 1yr sell off their SpaceX stock after the value rises while also ending the contract early?
they're spending $11B on compute because they need the compute and that's the market rate for it. it's the same price Anthropic is paying to spacex for compute.
but if they boost the spacex stock for the right amount of time, they can get that compute for free instead of for $11B. Google's own announcement of the deal frames it as a short-term agreement while they scale up their own datacenter capacity.
I’ve read lots of executive orders and it’s pretty standard. They don’t have much power. They are mostly just mandates and guidance for federal agencies, most of which is non binding, like a glorified mission statement. They just get sold as something bigger in the press.
Most voters don’t understand how the US government works, so EOs seem to be a way to pretend that the executive can pass laws. A way to make good on the campaign promises that require laws to be passed, which is usually all of them.
Our company uses yarn 4 which has an option to prevent you from installing an npm package for the first number of days of its release. Most of these seem to be caught within that timeframe (1-3 days).
> Now that the attack window has changed to 7 days, all new exploits like these will come with time bombs to not trigger until 8 days.
Many automated scanners use static code analysis rather than run the installation script. Not all of them are caught, but a good part of them are and you'd be saved by a delay.
- Best practice for both reliability and security is to not immediately upgrade to latest versions. Only immediately upgrade to security-patched versions. If your software doesn't need a new version, you can remain on the old version.
- When a feature you're developing, or a transitive dependency, requires an upgraded version, you can upgrade to the latest stable version that satisfies the dependency. But as each of those then requires an additional transitive dependency to be upgraded, you have more and more components upgraded to "latest", and the attack surface widens. So there are two alternatives:
1) (preferred) Upgrade to the latest version of the next-to-latest minor version, within the oldest major version that is supported, if that is available. This is the least number of changes that provides the needed functionality.
2) Upgrade only to the oldest version that gives you the functionality you need. If this ends up being the first version of a new major or minor version, this can cause bugs (initial releases of new major/minor always has bugs), so in that case you might as well use the latest version of that major/minor version.
This all affects security by avoiding upgrading to the latest version. It affects reliability by minimizing the amount of changes between your current version and upgraded version (changes lead to bugs).
The argument against all that, and for always upgrading to the latest versions, is intended to make software development easier. You avoid all the complexity of picking versions or reading changelogs by using software that is probably (but not always) all compatible. But it makes reliability and security worse. So you need to choose: do you want security and reliability, or an easier time writing code?
it would be way easier if dependencies were a flat list and not a graph, aka peer in npm parlance. I believe that’s what go does. A library only need to say that it depends 1.x.x or 1.2.x and it’s up to the application to provide it. Conflict is handled manually.
The onus is on libraries developers to cleanup their act. Start vendoring code instead of depending on hundreds tiny libraries.
Even if everyone used it, the security scanners would still have time to do their static analysis of new packages. Basically, all the clients implementing a delay would create a de facto quarantine status for new packages so they can be examined before everyone starts installing them. (Why npm doesn't just implement that themselves, I do not know.)
I think if they did it, then attackers would be able to iterate their attack against their own project, and once it passes the filters they could deploy for real.
I guess it could work better if it was enabled for only actual attack vectors projects.
That’s my point. For whatever reason, npm isn’t doing it. All npm users adding a minimum package age is kind of like doing it as a collective, without npm’s help.
Many places run analyzers on published code; many security users have reason to shorten the period. The default period becomes the period where white hats have a chance to detect it and stop it passing the threshold.
Fair, I didn’t do a “as of this morning check”. Should’ve done better. It’s sad because I moved away exactly because this feature was missing and now I’m not going back.
There is something to be said about the need to keep all the packages as the latest and the greatest at all times. Every minor version update doesn’t need to be immediately applied. And maybe high and critical vulnerabilities don’t need to be a minor version upgrade.
I’m having a real problem at work with security theatre and the growing push to obsess over numbers of “vulnerabilities” in our projects. And then auto Dependabot PRs that encourage churn to fix issues that if an informed person actually reviews easily concludes it doesn’t affect us in the slightest.
A separate pathway to updates. At the moment there is a pressure to keep all the packages updated at all times. Every time a new version of a random package deep in the dependency tree gets published, you roll a dice: is it a bunch of bug fixes that I don’t care about or a vulnerability patch that need to apply immediately? Since it could be either most devs just auto pilot on updates. This creates an environment where newly introduced vulnerabilities get promoted rather quickly before the version matures. Sure, waiting a few days to update a package sounds great, but there is no guarantee that the vulnerability will be found quickly.
To give you a context, I get 20-30 PRs a week across all my repos with potentially hundreds of packages (non distinct) from dependabot. I give it a cursory look and try to get a summary of changes. Do I evaluate every single package update? Nope.
Huh? Sorry but both of your comments are frankly incoherent. I have deep experience maintaining large dependency graphs and empatjize with the frustration about CVEs in deep transitive deps, but I can't make head or tail of your "separate pathway".
The one week cooldown option is not relying on other users to be a canary for you. Its just giving automated scanners a chance to notice. This is the perfect example. I don't think step security found this by accident. They are actively monitoring NPM package releases at some level.
There is something to be said that Microsoft should be scanning packages pre-release. They aren't, though, so for right now there is a ton of value with very little downside if people implement a one week cooldown period.
To answer your question directly, though. If everyone else moves to a one week cooldown, I would absolutely suggest a two week cooldown is a good idea. Being the "slow" moving organization is a good security trade-off so long as you don't take it to extremes and have escape hatches when you actually need to be moving quickly.
There's a really bad implicit assumption in there: Microsoft's scanners have solved the halting problem, so they can tell if a package update will ever flip to malicious mode, or has an intentionally inserted security hole in it.
Of course, this also assumes that Microsoft's internal scanners are much better than the scanners available to the attackers, since any reasonable attacker is going to just run their obfuscated code through a scanner as part of their CI job. (And maybe even use the MS scanner as an oracle by submitting fragments to NPM to see which pieces of their exploit chain get flagged.)
Waiting until everyone else canaries is much stronger, but even that doesn't work on a targeted attack.
Thank you for the thorough response. I got the following from yours and other responses:
* The JS ecosystem has been and will most likely continue to be fast-moving, so it's quite a safe assumption that at no point will a quarantine period be wide-spread.
* This quarantine period is for (semi-)automated scanners to catch the issue. Although considering the above there will always be a non-zero amount of end-user canaries as well.
* Maybe NPM should run scanners before distributing malware?
* If the ecosystem by any chance adopts a week-long quarantine period, you'd be safer if you applied a longer quarantine period.
> Maybe NPM should run scanners before distributing malware?
I suspect there's always a human checking these results. If NPM straight out rejects an update due to suspected malware, they might end up rejecting correct updates as well. If they grant some "safe" patterns a special pass, they might get exploited.
So I think this only works if you have security scanners that are well-maintained and kept in secret. NPM folks could of course co-operate with some security companies to have a first stab with the releases before they are put to public access. At some point some parties might start want to have monetary compensation for such an arragnement, though.
Look, nobody requested fully automated scanners that are never wrong. A scanner that asks the project owner to sign in with 2fa and confirm the release in case it's been flagged is going to be more than sufficient.
A large array of automated and semi-automated security scanners are finding things quickly. The main benefit of waiting before updating is to give those scanners time to work.
Security scans and authors realizing an unauthorized version was pushed will generally happen regardless of whether regular users updated. Even for compromises that are found by users updating, it'd generally be better to reduce the number of people affected with a slow roll-out rather than everyone jumping on at once.
@exitb it is much more desirable for security scanning companies to compete to find issues in a timely manor. If npm blessed one as a gatekeeper to the whole system they would be between a rock and a hard place. Unable to priorities high impact packages over the long tail of packages no one uses without pissing people off. Unable to add experimental new detections that may be a little noisy at first due to the huge disruption it would cause. Be trivial to game as obscure packages could brute-force their way though then use the same hole on a mainstream package.
I think the key right now is that these are semi-automated scanning processes. Right now, companies like step security selectively publish. So, in order for a hacking group to find out if their malware is detected or not, they have to burn access to a useful package.
None of this is to say I think Microsoft shouldn't be doing something as part of the release process on NPM. However, there is real value in giving more independent third parties a window to do things semi-manually.
Yeah, this is the part that I don't get. If the solution is "security testing should come before people install it", why is the big push to have people intentionally add this artificial delay to install later rather than moving the security testing earlier to before the release? If you want to make people not drive on the road until the pavement dries, you don't try to convince everyone to push back their workday by an hour; you just lay the asphalt an hour earlier.
It works because there are multiple companies doing it and double checking the results.
For example, is a crypto miner actually an attack? If the package presents itself as a miner, then no. Is connections to other repositories an attack? Again, depends on what the package does. Connections to some other hostname? Depends.
There is still a lot of human analysis that occurs in making the call that an attack is occurring.
Then the ... malware will just add delays? Or do they really do manual in-depth analysis of all new code? Just running and seeing it do things is probably a lot easier.
Security scanners won't be "manual in-depth analysis of all new code" or "Just running and seeing it do things", but somewhere in-between - utilizing static analysis/machine learning. It's a cat-and-mouse game, but the attacker adding code that waits X days to run something obfuscated would be another pattern that they could look for.
I think these attackers are unlikely to add a delay in the first place because the chance of their attack being found out before it activates would be too high. They seem to generally work on the assumption that they have a day or so before the package is yanked (e.g: from maintainer noticing their account is compromised) so need to move fast.
Most attacks are discovered 'pretty quickly' via scanning services and groups that monitor repositories. The problem is even an hour gap could mean tens of thousands of downloads and executions.
I think you can set it on internal repos, but then you need to allow-list internal code. People act like this is simple + solved, but it's not. It turns into 100K-1M's of LLM tokens on a semi-regular basis, or "just hire a build infra team for your side project" pretty quickly.
I don’t think people really care about rsync or the nuance. They just want to make an insta-reaction, rant about AI, then move on to the next story that raises their blood pressure.
Last time I read that story they were given the option to immediately fly back to Germany for free after their tourist visa was declined but the girls declined the flight because they wanted to fly somewhere else on another flight which wasn’t available yet, which means they had to be detained. So they stayed overnight in an immigration detention facility which included a search.
They also flew to Hawaii without a hotel booked which is something the guards always look for (that was basically 101 common knowledge when I first crossed 15yrs ago). Just like how having a flight out prebooked is important.
I read the article and it doesn’t say it was used for targeting or prioritizing?
> Neither Claude nor any other LLMs detects targets, processes radar, fuses sensor data or pairs weapons to targets. LLMs are late additions to Palantir’s ecosystem. In late 2024, years after the core system was operational, Palantir added an LLM layer – this is where Claude sits – that lets analysts search and summarise intelligence reports in plain English
There’s a lot of humans in that loop who make those decisions.
Yeah militaries don't use commercial chatbots for that, they have their own machine learning implementations. Look into Project Maven for example.
And while there are still humans in the loop, the impression I get is that this is increasingly becoming meaningless, from the way they talk about optimizing the "kill chain" and letting small teams make hundreds of targeting decisions per hour.
> The paradigm shift has already begun. Despite the row, Anthropic’s Claude has reportedly facilitated the massive and intensifying offensive which has already killed an estimated thousand-plus civilians in Iran. This is an era of bombing “quicker than the speed of thought”, experts told the Guardian this week, with AI identifying and prioritising targets, recommending weaponry and evaluating legal grounds for a strike.
If they want Iran to truely bend the knee over nukes then they have to commit harder militarily than they are now, which neither the president nor the public seems to have an appetite for and Iran knows that. So now it's mostly deadlocked on both the US demanding Iran lose face by giving up Uranium immediately, while Israel wants to keep up an air campaign to further neuter Irans combat capabilities to free up their own strategic goals against Hezbollah and Hamas. But neither options are properly aligned, especially with fanatics in IRGC taking over.
It's either a short air campaign or a war, but they can't seem to decide so we are left with an blockade.
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