If you treat it like real mail it ends up exactly the way the OP describes: a few high-value messages at risk of being lost in a deluge of low-value, often unsolicited, noise. My real mail is so full of stuff I don’t want and don’t care about that it makes me resistant to looking at it at all - in fact, the only reason I do (and irresponsibly infrequently at that) is because of mail that occasionally arrives that has legal or financial implications.
I think it’s reasonable to expect that sender-controlled messaging ends up in this state, particularly when the messaging platform is incentivized to support this model.
The only part that is actually considered a firearm under federal regulations is the lower receiver, so it is the only item that is controlled and requires paperwork. Everything else (with the exception of prohibited or specifically regulated items such as suppressors) is a generally available component that does not require the ATF to approve the purchase. Laws state to state on other components may vary, such as magazine capacity.
There's still a lot of ways the ATF can show up and shoot your dog if you pick the wrong components and put them together without paying $200 and waiting half an eternity.
The question, though, wasn’t whether ATF agents might interpret the regulations one way or another, but what the regulations are. Millions of people purchase legal and freely available components for their legal firearm with a serial number, and do not run afoul of the law. As soon as we are talking about components or firearms requiring a NFA tax stamp we’re in a different category though.
> She had gone straight to the lethal option and had no other recourse.
Not true. I presume that PSNI, like any law enforcement agency in the U.S., operates with some form of a use of force continuum that ranges from officer presence to deadly force. One of the most important aspects of that continuum that is taught to officers is that you can move up and down the continuum as the situation dictates. If you draw your sidearm you are not obligated to remain at that level of the use of force continuum. You should continue to make every effort to gain control of the situation, and deescalate.
At the same time, you are not obligated to use a lower level of force than that which you are facing, and a kitchen knife is a deadly weapon. It's very much a training issue as much as anything to educate officers in deescalation techniques, less-lethal weapons and control techniques, and scene management to minimize casualties. In the situation you describe though, it was absolutely appropriate for her to draw her sidearm, while still doing everything in her power to regain control of the situation so that she would not need to use it.
> Not true. I presume that PSNI, like any law enforcement agency in the U.S., operates with some form of a use of force continuum that ranges from officer presence to deadly force.
That's not what the person you're replying to means.
They mean despite what other options the officer had available to them, they had already reached for the lethal option (drawing their pistol) and from there had nowhere to go but threatening to kill or actually killing.
As soon as an officer turns up with a firearm, you have irreversibly escalated the situation to out-of-control insanity.
The county police became the de facto police department for Camden, which is a model for what would likely happen in any city: the police or sheriff’s department for the next largest jurisdiction encompassing the city would start policing the city.
Wait if the county police become your police if there's no other police department, then why does any city spend their taxes on their own police? And presumably if there's no county police the state police have jurisdiction.
> Wait if the county police become your police if there's no other police department, then why does any city spend their taxes on their own police?
Policy-wise the motivations for retaining a city police department can be differences in crime between urban and suburban/rural areas, and population density & subsequent patrol officer density - and as a subset of that, response times. I would imagine that cities, and specifically the elected leaders, are also under significant pressure from police unions to retain their departments. Furthermore, disbanding a police department for any major city means that the county or state police department suddenly has to take on the workload of what was previously being done by hundreds (or sometimes thousands) of city police, and no department is prepared for that.
> And presumably if there's no county police the state police have jurisdiction.
There are many cities in the US that are outside of any county, and are their own incorporated entity on par in the hierarchy with the surrounding counties. As such the state police would be the most likely department to take over policing. Again though, that's a major resource burden and logistics problem; any feelings about the pros and cons of reduced police presence aside no policy maker is likely going to be comfortable with that kind of impact.
Interestingly, I implemented every mitigation listed in the article: kill the web server process, remove and add an empty directory at `~/.zoomus` to prevent it being re-added, remove Firefox's content type action for Zoom, and disable video turning on when Zoom launches. When I visit a Zoom join link or the POC link above, Firefox prompts me to open the Zoom client to join the meeting, and when I click "Open Link" the client opens just as it should and joins the meeting.
This seems to confirm that there is no functionality to create a seamless experience for the user that actually requires the presence of the web server. If you don't have the client installed the page can prompt you to download it the same as it would the very first time you download and install it. You can ask your browser to remember the link association and not be prompted for which app the link should open going forward. These are minor steps, even for a regular user, and ones with which most users are likely already familiar.
To me this further illustrates that the web server is truly just a ploy on Zoom's part to keep their hooks in users' systems, and have a way in that the user isn't privy to. Any other excuse they are giving about "enhanced experience" is dubious at best and deceitful at worst.
This is an area where I think the Coast Guard does a decent job. We have a program called Team Coordination Training[0] which, while monotonous and annoying to those who have to take it every year, aims to instruct students on the importance of clear, non-punitive communication between all members of a crew or team to ensure maximum situational awareness. Some implementations of the training are better than others, but the intent is good, and is a more useful tool than generic risk assessment models that are frequently blown off in practice.
I was a Junior Officer on a Coast Guard cutter for a year and a half. Without a doubt it comes down to command climate. Our Captain had "Standing Orders" that every deck watch officer was required to follow. This is required for all Coast Guard vessels, and I imagine for all Navy vessels as well. Included in these were reasons to call the Captain, where if certain parameters were met you had to call the Captain (and if its late at night that meant waking him/her up, explaining a situation over the phone, and providing a valid recommendation in accordance with the navigation rules of the road). The JOs I knew who made shitty and dangerous deck watch officers were those who would try to skirt the rules in order to avoid calling the captain. If the standing orders said to call the captain and provide a solution to avoid coming within two nautical miles of another vessel, and the radar was providing closest point of approach solutions that bounced between 1 nm and 2 nm, they would interpret that as not being necessary to call the captain.
So why would a deck watch officer not want to call the captain? Well if the captain refuses to ever admit to being wrong, chews people out for tiny things, tells people not to disturb them, or overall doesnt support their junior members then people become less worried about safety and more worried about covering their ass. A lack of training, crew fatigue and bad command end up with bad decisions being made, and when bad decisions are made at that scale people can die.
Totally. In the audio you can hear in the junior guys voice that he has no respect for his superior officer but is also terrified of him. The officer doesn't have a feel for how his ship handles and doesn't seem to fully understand the COLREGS either.
Spot on. In the Coast Guard we have a similar operational risk assessment model called General Assessment of Risk (GAR)[0], which uses six categories and a score of 1-10 in each to get a cumulative score, which corresponds to either Green (low risk), Amber (moderate risk), or Red (high risk). In a best-case scenario, all involved in the operation will conduct a GAR brief as a group, and the person doing the brief will solicit the group for what number they would give for each category, and the highest number anyone calls out is the one the whole group goes with. Typically, if somebody calls out a 5 or higher, they are asked to explain why they feel the risk in that category is so high. Once the reasons are identified, the group then "mitigates" the risk by discussing the identified reasons so that everyone understands the risks. The score is tallied, and the color (risk level) is identified.
That is the best-case, textbook way to run the model. Still very subjective pseudo-science, masquerading as objective risk management, but at least has something of a method to it.
In practice, the repetitiveness of the GAR model results in many crews blowing it off, and giving a vague, arbitrary cumulative score without any discussion around how they got there. This sounds bad, and by policy it is bad, but in practice I have observed no discernible difference in how crews approach risky missions and operations when they conduct a full GAR brief or just give a somewhat random score and move on. In other words, the GAR model does not seem to provide any tangible risk management benefit, and largely seems to serve as a bureaucratic CYA solution.
GAR was introduced in an attempt to reduce the number of mishaps occurring due to what was deemed to be excessive risk-taking. The statistics may demonstrate that it had that effect, though I would argue from my perspective that other training programs introduced to address problems related to risk assessment have far more deckplate-level impact and effectiveness. The problem with GAR is that it tries to objectively standardize something which is, by its very nature, dynamic and subjective. No two people, in the exact same situation and having the exact same capabilities and experience, assess the risk the same way. Assigning numbers to a series of broad categories and giving a color-coded risk level to the situation does not inform anyone of anything very useful. Discussion of risk factors is more helpful, but due to the way the system is structured, is a step frequently skipped.
What matters far more is focusing on continuous, dynamic training and education of those in billets for whom risk management is a critical part of the safe completion of their mission, and emphasizing clear communication unfettered by rank or positional authority to ensure that everyone has full situational awareness. Be respectful, but make sure that information can move freely between all involved.
I think what I learned from my superiors is that it doesnt matter so much what system is used for risk assessment, but whether a conversation about risk was had in a meaningful way. Sometimes quantification helps this, where complex systems can be analyzed and the consequences assessed. Usually if you are going to do that it has to happen well in advance of an operation. Othertimes the desire to get a number leads to a real ham fisted attempt to "quantify" things like how fatigued the crew is on a scale of 1-10, or to rate the environmental conditions. When the GAR model, which stands for Green - Amber - Red, was used to facilitate an honest conversation about how people felt about an operation as opposed to just checking a box so that it could be put in the logs. When I saw it being used as the former it absolutely made things safer, but that was very dependent on the attitude of those participating.
Agreed, and a more succinct way of saying what I was getting at. Attempts to quantify inherently subjective attempts aren't very productive in their own right. What matters far more is having a substantive conversation about risk, and work to promote a culture of open and honest communication.
How would you make them answer truthfully? Admitting to being tired either means you're showing personal weakness, or you're calling your superiors incompetent at scheduling. Neither possibility sounds good for your career. I think it would be better to measure reaction times, eg. by making them catch a falling ruler immediately after it's dropped and seeing how far it falls.
This is why good leaders create an environment where you can be honest about such things. You are basically talking about an inhumane system led by fear. Then again we are talking about the navy here...
This is part of the reason why they institute fatigue standards, to try to keep people from being over tired and still working, which led to people being hurt.
The hard part is that no one wants to admit that they are tired. Everyone wants to be "that guy" or "that girl" who is always ready to go. After all, most people Ive met in the military have a hard time putting themselves to bed because they have the next watch when its 0200 and we're pulling migrants off rafts or running helicopter ops to interdict $100 million worth of cocaine. During lots of operations you will have a lot of the crew stood up to run things, so balancing crew fatigue with surge operations is no trivial task. The SWO community could take a lot of pointers from the aviation folks - they are way better about making sure people get mandatory rest.
Yes, AIS is utilized by all ships, and even though military vessels are permitted to not broadcast in the clear their AIS data, they can still receive other ships' AIS broadcasts.
That being said, you still need competent mariners on the bridge who can look at their instruments - AIS, ECDIS/chartplotter, radar - as well as use their own eyes looking out the window to interpret that information and made a prudent decision. As the Navigation Rules[0] are written, all vessels must maintain a proper lookout, and electronic systems by themselves are not a substitute.
Once a mariner determines that risk of collision exists, regardless of whether they are the stand-on or give-way vessel, they must take sufficient action to avoid collision. Additionally, depending on what the situation between the two vessels is (meeting, crossing, overtaking), they are required to exchange sound signals to indicate their maneuvering intention and acknowledgement by the other vessel of that stated intention, or may make those arrangements by radio in lieu of sound signals. All of that requires prudent, competent mariners who can recognize what is happening around them, and their responsibilities in any situation involving another vessel.
If they're not actively engaged in a naval exercise or actual warfighting requiring them to maneuver outside the Navigation Rules[0], they are subject to the rules the same as any other vessel - and even then, that's a pretty hard argument to make without actual shots fired in anger. Considerations are made in the rules for special requirements for lighting of naval vessels that, by the nature of their design, are unable to comply with the rules. However, the rules regarding avoiding collision apply to everyone, at all times.
I think it’s reasonable to expect that sender-controlled messaging ends up in this state, particularly when the messaging platform is incentivized to support this model.
ETA: typo fixes