This is just a really bad analogy. It doesn't addresses that there are multiple sources, the incentives to be telling us about it, and the spectrum between disaster-mitigation heroes and snake-oil salesmen.
The calculus in Iran is that they have yet to play the card they've been investing most in: make boots on the ground untenable.
Until Iran feels that their best card is valued correctly - either by being played, or made unplayable - reports on "negotiations" are meaningless fluff.
I've been using a dedicated user account for 6 months now, and it does everything. What makes it great is the only axis of configuration is managing "what's hoisted into its accessible directories".
Its awe-inspiring the levels of complexity people will re-invent/bolt-on to achieve comparable (if not worse) results.
The US media has a clear understanding that their reporting on the war needs to be filtered and biased. This is not some coming-to-their-senses against sensationalism, but a nothingburger they know they can't sensationalize without great risk.
As is the case in any administration; let alone with an admin as vindictive as Trump's.
This "balanced take" warrants kudos?
We're not even pretending to lift the bar off the ground when it comes to mainstream media, are we?
Its also worth underlining that it's not just "The parsing computation is fast enough that V8's JIT eliminates any Rust advantage", but specifically that this kind of straight-forward well-defined data structures and mutation, without any strange eval paths or global access is going to be JITed to near native speed relatively easily.
> > I also don't care for the "security" argument when parts of the core reference implementation are written in a memory-unsafe language.
> Doesn't sound like a super informed way to look at security (not even mentioning that Wayland was started in 2008, and Rust was not a thing). One can also say that "as long as you run X11, there is no need to think about security because X11 just defeats it all".
I think the argument is not that X11 defeats it all - but that for 99.9999% of users its security theater when deployed in the real world. Most commonly, as long as processes can read each other's memory/configuration/etc.
I'm sure there is a use-case for untrusted sharing of Wayland enabled GPU rendering or something - though AFAIK none of the enterprise remote desktop use it, and they have the resources to implement it themselves anyway.
I've been running Wayland for two years now. I still hit weird bugs with desktop sharing / obs tinkering; It's just not a critical use for me.
So it's fair to question the design wisdom of adding the complexity and UX pain points if it seems to be worth so little.
But maybe i'm overlooking some large group of people dependent on Wayland security boundaries?
I'm using `pi` as my agent and build my entire agent orchestration on like 4 skills to start / stop / capture / await a set of tmux-bash & tmux-pi sessions.
This is the first time in a few months I might actually try `claude` cli again to try out this channels scheme.
US Police are trained such that their first impression in any situation is to see how people are reacting to their authority, and if it's not acquiesced to go on high alert.
It's not that they couldn't understand; It's that it's a faux pas to question this way of thinking so nobody does.
Play that out long enough and you get clown shows like these.
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